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Abstract. At Crypto’07, Goyal introduced the concept of Accountable
Authority Identity-Based Encryption as a convenient tool to reduce the
amount of trust in authorities in Identity-Based Encryption. In this
model, if the Private Key Generator (PKG) maliciously re-distributes
users’ decryption keys, it runs the risk of being caught and prosecuted.
Goyal proposed two constructions: the first one is efficient but can only
trace well-formed decryption keys to their source; the second one allows
tracing obfuscated decryption boxes in a model (called weak black-box
model) where cheating authorities have no decryption oracle. The lat-
ter scheme is unfortunately far less efficient in terms of decryption cost
and ciphertext size. The contribution of this paper is to describe a new
construction that combines the efficiency of Goyal’s first proposal with
a very simple weak black-box tracing mechanism. The proposed scheme
is presented in the selective-ID model but readily extends to meet all
security properties in the adaptive-ID sense, which is not known to be
true for prior black-box schemes.
Keywords. Identity-based encryption, traceability, efficiency.
1 Introduction
Identity-based cryptography, first proposed by Shamir [39], alleviates the need
for digital certificates used in traditional public-key infrastructures. In such sys-
tems, users’ public keys are public identifiers (e.g. email addresses) and the
matching private keys are derived by a trusted party called Private Key Genera-
tor (PKG). The first practical construction for Identity-Based Encryption (IBE)
was put forth by Boneh and Franklin [8] – despite the bandwidth-demanding
⋆ The first author acknowledges the Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research
(F.R.S.-F.N.R.S.) for their financial support and the BCRYPT Interuniversity At-
traction Pole. The second author is supported by the European Commission through
the IST Program under Contract ICT-2007-216646 ECRYPT II and by the French
Agence Nationale de la Recherche through the PACE project.
⋆⋆ This is the full version of a paper with the same title presented in Public Key
Cryptography 2009 [31]
proposal by Cocks [17] – and, since then, a large body of work has been devoted
to the design of schemes with additional properties or relying on different algo-
rithmic assumptions [23, 5, 6, 35, 41, 7, 21, 13, 9].
In spite of its appealing advantages, identity-based encryption has not un-
dergone rapid adoption as a standard. The main reason is arguably the fact
that it requires unconditional trust in the PKG: the latter can indeed decrypt
any ciphertext or, even worse, re-distribute users’ private keys. The key escrow
problem can be mitigated as suggested in [8] by sharing the master secret among
multiple PKGs, but this inevitably entails extra communication and infrastruc-
ture. Related paradigms [20, 3] strived to remove the key escrow problem but
only did so at the expense of losing the benefit of human-memorizable public
keys: these models get rid of escrow authorities but both involve traditional
(though not explicitly certified) public keys that are usually less convenient to
work with than easy-to-remember public identifiers.
In 2007, Goyal [24] explored a new approach to deter rogue actions from
authorities. With the Accountable Authority Identity-Based Encryption (A-IBE)
primitive, if the PKG discloses a decryption key associated with some identity
over the Internet, it runs the risk of being caught and sued by the user. A-IBE
schemes achieve this goal by means of an interactive private key generation pro-
tocol between the user and the PKG. For each identity, there are exponentially-
many families of possible decryption keys. The key generation protocol provides
the user with a single decryption key while concealing to the PKG the family
that this key belongs to. From this private key, the user is computationally un-
able to find one from a different family. Hence, for a given identity, a pair of
private keys from distinct families serves as evidence of a fraudulent PKG. The
latter remains able to passively eavesdrop communications but is discouraged to
reveal users’ private keys. Also, users cannot falsely accuse an honest PKG since
they are unable to compute a new key from a different family using a given key.
Prior Works. Two constructions were given in [24]. The first one (that we call
Goyal -1 hereafter) builds on Gentry’s IBE [21] and, while efficient, only allows
tracing well-formed decryption keys. This white-box model seems unlikely to
suffice in practice since malicious parties can rather release an imperfect and/or
obfuscated program that only decrypts with small but noticeable probability.
The second scheme of [24] (let us call it Goyal -2), which is constructed on the
Sahai-Waters fuzzy IBE [35], has a variant providing weak black-box traceabil-
ity: even an imperfect pirate decryption box can be traced (based on its in-
put/output behavior) back to its source although traceability is only guaranteed
against dishonest PKGs that have no decryption oracle in the attack game. How-
ever, Goyal -2 is somewhat inefficient as decryption requires a number of pairing
calculations that is linear in the security parameter. For the usually required
security level, ciphertexts contain more than 160 group elements and decryption
calculates a product of about 160 pairings.
Subsequently, Au et al. [4] described another A-IBE scheme providing re-
trievability (i.e., a property that prevents the PKG from revealing more than
one key for a given identity without exposing its master key) but remained in
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the white-box model. More recently, Goyal et al. [25] modified the Goyal -2 sys-
tem using attribute-based encryption techniques [35, 26] to achieve full black-box
traceability: unlike Goyal -2, the scheme of [25] preserves security against dishon-
est PKGs that have access to a decryption oracle in the model. While definitely
desirable in practice, this property is currently achievable only at the expense of
the same significant penalty as in Goyal -2 [24] in terms of decryption cost and
ciphertext size.
Our Contributions. We present a very efficient and conceptually simple
scheme with weak black-box traceability. We prove its security (in the standard
model) under the same assumption as Goyal -2. Decryption keys and ciphertexts
consist of a constant number of group elements and their length is thus linear
in the security parameter λ (instead of quadratic as in Goyal -2). Encryption and
decryption take O(λ3)-time (w.r.t. O(λ4) in Goyal -2) with only two pairing com-
putations as for the latter (against more than 160 in Goyal -2).
While presented in the selective-ID security model (where adversaries must
choose the identity that will be their prey at the outset of the game) for simplic-
ity, our scheme is easily adaptable to the adaptive-ID model of [8]. In contrast,
one of the security properties (i.e., the infeasibility for users to frame innocent
PKGs) was only established in the selective-ID setting for known schemes in the
black-box model (i.e., Goyal -2 and its fully black-box extension [25]). Among
such schemes, ours thus appears to be the first one that can be tweaked so as to
achieve adaptive-ID security against dishonest users.
Our scheme performs almost as well as Goyal -1 (the main overhead being
a long master public key a` la Waters [41] to obtain the adaptive-ID security).
In comparison with the latter, that was only analyzed in a white-box model of
traceability, our system provides several other advantages:
- Its security relies on a weaker assumption. So far, the only fully practical
A-IBE scheme was resting on assumptions whose strength grows with the
number of adversarial queries, which can be as large as 230 as commonly
assumed in the literature. Such assumptions are subject to a limited attack
[16] that requires a careful adjustment of group sizes (by as much as 50%
additional bits) to guarantee a secure use of schemes.
- It remains secure when many users want to run the key generation protocol
in a concurrent fashion. Goyal -1 has a key generation protocol involving zero-
knowledge proofs. As its security reductions require to rewind adversaries at
each key generation query, security is only guaranteed when the PKG inter-
acts with users sequentially. In inherently concurrent environments like the
Internet, key generation protocols should remain secure when executed by
many users willing to register at the same time. By minimizing the num-
ber of rewinds in reductions, we ensure that our scheme remains secure in a
concurrent setting. In these regards, the key generation protocol of Goyal -2
makes use of oblivious transfers (OT) in sub-protocols. It thus supports con-
currency whenever the underlying OT protocol does. As already mentioned
however, our scheme features a much better efficiency than Goyal -2.
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- In a white-box model of traceability, it can be made secure against dishonest
PKGs equipped with a decryption oracle3. In the following, we nevertheless
focus on the (arguably more interesting) weak black-box traceability aspect.
As an extension to the proceedings version of this paper [31], we also show
how to apply the idea of our weak black-box tracing mechanism to Gentry’s
IBE. The resulting A-IBE system is obtained by bringing a simple modification
to the key generation protocol of Goyal -1 so as to perfectly hide the user’s key
family from the PKG’s view while preserving the efficiency of the whole scheme.
Since the resulting system inherits the efficiency of Gentry’s IBE and the Goyal -1
white-box A-IBE, it turns out to be the most efficient weakly black-box A-IBE
construction to date. Its (adaptive-ID) security is moreover proved under a tight
reduction (albeit under a strong assumption).
Finally, since detecting misbehaving PKGs is an equally relevant problem
in IBE primitives and their generalizations, we show how the underlying idea
of previous schemes can be applied to one of the most practical identity-based
broadcast encryption (IBBE) realizations [10]. We also argue that the same
technique similarly applies in the context of attribute-based encryption [35, 26].
Organization. In the rest of the paper, section 2 recalls the A-IBE security
model defined in [24]. We first analyze the white-box version of our scheme in
section 3 and then describe a weak black-box tracing mechanism in section 4.
Sections 5 and 6 describe and analyze the extensions of our method to Gentry’s
IBE and the Boneh-Hamburg IBBE scheme, respectively.
2 Background and Definitions
Syntactic definition and security model. We recall the definition of A-
IBE schemes and their security properties as defined in [24].
Definition 1. An Accountable Authority Identity-Based Encryption scheme
(A-IBE) is a tuple (Setup,Keygen,Encrypt,Decrypt,Trace) of efficient al-
gorithms or protocols such that:
– Setup takes as input a security parameter and outputs a master public key
mpk and a matching master secret key msk.
– Keygen(PKG,U) is an interactive protocol between the public parameter gen-
erator PKG and the user U:
· the common input to PKG and U are: the master public key mpk and an
identity ID for which the decryption key has to be generated;
· the private input to PKG is the master secret key msk.
Both parties may use a sequence of private coin tosses as additional inputs.
The protocol ends with U receiving a decryption key dID as his private output.
– Encrypt takes as input the master public key mpk, an identity ID and a
message m and outputs a ciphertext.
3 We believe that the Goyal -1 system can also be modified so as to obtain this property.
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– Decrypt takes as input the master public key mpk, a decryption key dID and
a ciphertext C and outputs a message.
– Trace given the master public key mpk, a decryption key dID, this algorithm
outputs a key family number nF or the special symbol ⊥ if dID is ill-formed.
Correctness requires that, for any outputs (mpk,msk) of Setup, any plaintext m
and any identity ID, whenever dID ← Keygen
(PKG(msk),U)(mpk, ID), we have
Trace
(
mpk, dID
)
6=⊥,
Decrypt
(
mpk, dID,Encrypt(mpk, ID,m)
)
= m.
The above definition is for the white-box setting. In a black-box model, Trace
takes as input an identity ID, the corresponding user’s well-formed private key
dID and a decryption box D that successfully opens a non-negligible fraction ε of
ciphertexts encrypted under ID. The output of Trace is either “PKG” or “User”
depending on which party is found guilty for having crafted D.
Goyal formalized three security properties for A-IBE schemes. The first one
is the standard notion of privacy [8] for IBE systems. As for the other ones, the
FindKey game captures the intractability for the PKG to create a decryption
key of the same family as the one obtained by the user during the key generation
protocol. Finally, the ComputeNewKey game models the infeasibility for users
to generate a key d
(2)
ID
outside the family of the legally obtained one d
(1)
ID
.
Definition 2. An A-IBE scheme is deemed secure if all probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) adversaries have negligible advantage in the following games.
1. The IND-ID-CCA game. For any PPT algorithm A, the model considers
the following game, where λ ∈ N is a security parameter:
GameIND-ID-CCAA (λ)
(mpk,msk)← Setup(λ)
(m0,m1, ID
⋆, s)← ADec,KG(find,mpk)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dec : (C, ID)
99K Decrypt
(
mpk,msk, ID, C
)
;
KG : ID 99K Keygen(PKG(msk),A)(mpk, ID)
// ID 6= ID⋆
d⋆
$
← {0, 1}
C⋆ ← Encrypt(mpk, ID⋆,md⋆)
d← ADec,KG(guess, s, C⋆)∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Dec : (C, ID) 99K Decrypt
(
mpk,msk, ID, C
)
;
// (C, ID) 6= (C⋆, ID⋆)
KG : ID 99K Keygen(PKG(msk),A)(mpk, ID)
// ID 6= ID⋆
return 1 if d = d⋆ and 0 otherwise.
A’s advantage is measured by AdvCCAA (λ) = |Pr[Game
CCA
A = 1]− 1/2|.
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The weaker definition of chosen-plaintext security (IND-ID-CPA) is formal-
ized in the same way in [8] but A is not granted access to a decryption oracle.
2. The FindKey game. Let A be a PPT algorithm. We consider the following
game, where λ ∈ N is a security parameter:
GameFindKeyA (λ)
(mpk, ID, s1)← A(setup, λ)
(d
(1)
ID
, s2)← Keygen
(A(s1),·)(mpk, ID)
d
(2)
ID
← A(findkey, s1, s2)
return 1 if Trace(mpk, d
(1)
ID
) = Trace(mpk, d
(2)
ID
)
0 otherwise.
A’s advantage is now defined as AdvFindKeyA (λ) = Pr[Game
FindKey
A = 1].
Here, the adversary A acts as a cheating PKG and the challenger emulates the
honest user. Both parties engage in a key generation protocol where the chal-
lenger obtains a private key for an identity ID chosen by A. The latter aims at
producing a private key corresponding to ID and belonging to the same family
as the key obtained by the challenger in the key generation protocol. Such a
successful dishonest PKG could disclose user keys without being caught.
Note that, at the beginning of the experiment, A generates mpk without re-
vealing the master key msk and the challenger runs a sanity check on mpk.
As noted in [24], it makes sense to provide A with a decryption oracle that
undoes ciphertexts using d
(1)
ID
(and could possibly leak information on the lat-
ter’s family) between steps 2 and 3 of the game. We call this enhanced notion
FindKey-CCA (as opposed to the weaker one which we call FindKey-CPA).
Finally, in the black-box model, instead of outputting a new key d
(2)
ID
, the
dishonest PKG comes up with a decryption box D that correctly decrypts ci-
phertexts intended for ID with non-negligible probability ε and wins if the tracing
algorithm returns “User” when run on d
(1)
ID
and with oracle access to D.
3. The ComputeNewKey game. For a PPT algorithm A, the model finally
considers the following game:
GameComputeNewKeyA (λ)
(mpk,msk)← Setup(λ)
(d
(1)
ID⋆
, d
(2)
ID⋆
, ID⋆)← AKG(mpk)∣∣KG : ID 99K Keygen(PKG(msk),A)(mpk, ID)
return 1 if Trace(mpk, d
(1)
ID⋆
) 6=⊥ and
Trace(mpk, d
(2)
ID⋆
) /∈ {⊥,Trace(mpk, d
(1)
ID⋆
)}
0 otherwise.
A’s advantage is AdvComputeNewKeyA (λ) = Pr[Game
ComputeNewKey
A = 1].
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The ComputeNewKey game involves an adversary interacting with a PKG in
executions of the key generation protocol and obtaining private keys associated
with distinct identities of her choosing. The adversary is declared successful if,
for some identity that may have been queried for key generation, she is able to
find two private keys from distinct families. Such a pair would allow her to trick
a judge into wrongly believing in a misbehavior of the PKG.
In the black-box scenario, the output of the dishonest user consist of a key
d
(1)
ID⋆
and a pirate decryption box D that yields the correct answer with prob-
ability ε when provided with a ciphertext encrypted for ID⋆. In this case, the
adversary wins if the output of TraceD(mpk, d
(1)
ID⋆
) is “PKG”.
In [14], Canetti, Halevi and Katz suggested relaxed notions of IND-ID-CCA
and IND-ID-CPA security where the adversary has to choose the target identity
ID⋆ ahead of time (even before seeing the master public key mpk). This re-
laxed model, called “selective-ID” model (or IND-sID-CCA and IND-sID-CPA
for short), can be naturally extended to the ComputeNewKey notion.
Bilinear Maps and Complexity Assumptions. We use prime order groups
(G,GT ) endowed with an efficiently computable map e : G×G→ GT such that:
1. e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab for any (g, h) ∈ G×G and a, b ∈ Z;
2. e(g, h) 6= 1GT whenever g, h 6= 1G.
In such bilinear groups, we assume the hardness of the (now classical) Decision
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem that has been widely used in the recent years.
Definition 3. Let (G,GT ) be bilinear groups of prime order p and g ∈ G. The
Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DBDH) is to distinguish the
distributions of tuples (ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) and (ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z) for random
values a, b, c, z
$
← Z∗p. The advantage of a distinguisher B is measured by
AdvDBDHG,GT (λ) =
∣∣Pr[a, b, c $← Z∗p : B(ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) = 1]
− Pr[a, b, c, z
$
← Z∗p : B(g
a, gb, gc, e(g, g)z) = 1]
∣∣.
For convenience, we use an equivalent formulation – called modified DBDH – of
the problem which is to distinguish e(g, g)ab/c from random given (ga, gb, gc).
3 The Basic Scheme
The scheme mixes ideas from the “commutative-blinding” [5] and “exponent-
inversion” [36] frameworks. Private keys have the same shape as in commutative-
blinding-based schemes [5, 6, 41, 13]. At the same time, their first element is a
product of two terms, the first one of which is inspired from Gentry’s IBE [21].
According to a technique applied in [24], private keys contain a family num-
ber t that cannot be tampered with while remaining hidden from the PKG. This
family number t is determined by combining two random values t0 and t1 re-
spectively chosen by the user and the PKG in the key generation protocol. The
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latter begins with the user sending a commitment R to t0. Upon receiving R, the
PKG turns it into a commitment to t0 + t1 and uses the modified commitment
to generate a “blinded” private key d′
ID
. The user obtains his final key dID by
“unblinding” d′
ID
thanks to the randomness that was used to compute R.
A difference with Goyal -1 is that the key family number is perfectly hid-
den to the PKG and the FindKey-CPA security is unconditional. In the key
generation protocol, the user’s first message is a perfectly hiding commitment
that comes along with a witness-indistinguishable (WI) proof of knowledge of its
opening. In Goyal -1, users rather send a deterministic (and thus non-statistically
hiding) commitment and knowledge of the underlying value must be proven in
zero-knowledge because a proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm must be
simulated (by rewinding the adversary) in the proof of FindKey-CPA security.
In the present scheme, the latter does not rely on a specific assumption and we
do not need to simulate knowing the solution of a particular problem instance.
Therefore, we can dispense with perfectly ZK proofs and settle for a more effi-
cient 3-move WI proof (such as Okamoto’s variant [33] of Schnorr [38]) whereas
4 rounds are needed using zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge.
3.1 Description
Setup: given λ ∈ N, the PKG selects bilinear groups (G,GT ) of prime order
p > 2λ with a random generator g
$
← G. It chooses h, Y, Z
$
← G and x
$
← Z∗p
at random. It defines its master key as msk := x and the master public key
is chosen as mpk := (X = gx, Y, Z, h).
.Keygen(PKG,U) : to obtain a private key for his identity ID, a user U interacts
with the PKG in the following key generation protocol.
1. The user U draws t0, θ
$
← Z∗p, provides the PKG with a commitment
R = ht0 ·Xθ and also gives an interactive witness indistinguishable proof
of knowledge of the pair (t0, θ), which he retains for later use.
2. The PKG outputs ⊥ if the proof of knowledge fails to verify. Otherwise,
it picks r′, t1
$
← Z∗p and returns
d′ID = (d
′
1, d
′
2, d
′
3) =
(
(Y · R · ht1)1/x · (gID · Z)r
′
, Xr
′
, t1
)
. (1)
3. U picks r′′
$
← Z∗p and computes dID = (d
′
1/g
θ ·(gID ·Z)r
′′
, d′2 ·X
r′′, d′3+t0)
which should equal
dID = (d1, d2, d3) =
(
(Y · ht0+t1)1/x · (gID · Z)r, Xr, t0 + t1
)
(2)
where r = r′ + r′′. Then, U checks whether dID satisfies the relation
e(d1, X) = e(Y, g) · e(h, g)
d3 · e(gID · Z, d2). (3)
If so, he sets his private key as dID and the latter belongs to the family of
decryption keys identified by nF = d3 = t0+ t1. He outputs ⊥ otherwise.
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Encrypt: to encrypt m ∈ GT given mpk and ID, choose s
$
← Z∗p and compute
C =
(
C1, C2, C3, C4
)
=
(
Xs, (gID · Z)s, e(g, h)s, m · e(g, Y )s
)
.
Decrypt: given C =
(
C1, C2, C3, C4
)
and dID = (d1, d2, d3), compute
m = C4 ·
( e(C1, d1)
e(C2, d2) · C
d3
3
)−1
(4)
Trace: given a purported private key dID = (d1, d2, d3) and an identity ID, check
the validity of dID w.r.t. ID using relation (3). If valid, dID is declared as a
member of the family identified by nF = d3.
The correctness of the scheme follows from the fact that well-formed private keys
always satisfy relation (3). By raising both members of (3) to the power s ∈ Z∗p,
we see that the quotient of pairings in (11) actually equals e(g, Y )s.
The scheme features about the same efficiency as classical IBE schemes de-
rived from the commutative-blinding framework [5]. Encryption demands no
pairing calculation since e(g, h) and e(g, Y ) can both be cached as part of the
system parameters. Decryption requires to compute a quotient of two pairings
which is significantly faster than two independent pairing evaluations when op-
timized in the same way as modular multi-exponentiations.
In comparison with the most efficient standard model scheme based on the
same assumption (which is currently the first scheme of [5]), the only overhead
is a slightly longer ciphertext and an extra exponentiation in GT at both ends.
3.2 Security
Selective-ID Security. We first prove the IND-sID-CPA security under the
modified DBDH assumption (mDBDH).
Theorem 1. The scheme is IND-sID-CPA under the mDBDH assumption.
Proof. We show how a simulator B can interact with a selective-ID adversary
A to solve a mDBDH instance (Ta = g
a, Tb = g
b, Tc = g
c, T
?
= e(g, g)ab/c). At
the outset of the game, A announces the target identity ID⋆. To prepare mpk, B
chooses α, γ, t∗
$
← Z∗p and sets X = Tc = g
c, h = Tb = g
b, Y = Xγ · h−t
∗
, and
Z = g−ID
⋆
·Xα. The adversary’s view is simulated as follows.
Queries: at any time, Amay trigger an execution of the key generation protocol
for an identity ID 6= ID⋆ of her choosing. She then supplies an element
R = ht0 ·Xθ along with a WI proof of knowledge of (t0, θ). The simulator B
verifies the proof but does not need to rewind the adversary as it can answer
the query without knowing (t0, θ). To do so, it picks t1
$
← Z∗p at random and
defines W = Y · R · ht1 , d′3 = t1. Elements d
′
1 and d
′
2 are generated as
(d′1, d
′
2) =
(
(gID · Z)r
′
·W−
α
ID−ID⋆ , Xr
′
·W−
1
ID−ID⋆
)
(5)
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using a random r′
$
← Z∗p. If we set r˜
′ = r′ − wc(ID−ID⋆) , where w = logg(W ),
we observe that (d′1, d
′
2) has the correct distribution since
W 1/c · (gID · Z)r˜
′
=W 1/c · (gID−ID
⋆
·Xα)r˜
′
=W 1/c · (gID−ID
⋆
·Xα)r
′
· (gID−ID
⋆
)−
w
c(ID−ID⋆) ·X−
wα
c(ID−ID⋆)
= (gID · Z)r
′
·W−
α
ID−ID⋆
and X r˜
′
= Xr
′
· (gc)−
w
c(ID−ID⋆) = Xr
′
·W−
1
ID−ID⋆ . Finally, the “partial private
key” (d′1, d
′
2, d
′
3) is returned to A. Note that the above calculation can be
carried out without knowing w = logg(W ) or the representation (t0, θ) of R
w.r.t. to (h,X) and B does not need to rewind A.
Challenge: when the first stage is over, A outputs m0,m1 ∈ GT . At this point,
B picks r⋆
$
← Z∗p and defines a private key (d1, d2, d3) = (g
γ ·Xαr
⋆
, Xr
⋆
, t∗)
for the identity ID∗. It flips a fair coin d⋆
$
← {0, 1} and encrypts md⋆ as
C⋆1 = Ta = g
a C⋆2 = T
α
a C
⋆
3 = T C
⋆
4 = md⋆ ·
e(C⋆1 , d1)
e(C⋆2 , d2) · C
⋆
3
d3
.
We see that (d1, d2, d3) is a valid key for ID
⋆. Since gID
⋆
· Z = Xα = Tαc
and h = gb, C⋆ = (C⋆1 , C
⋆
2 , C
⋆
3 , C
⋆
4 ) is a valid encryption of md⋆ (with the
exponent s = a/c) if T = e(g, g)ab/c. If T is random, we have T = e(g, h)s
′
for some random s′ ∈ Z∗p and thus C
⋆
4 = md⋆ · e(Y, g)
s · e(g, h)(s−s
′)t∗ , which
means that md⋆ is perfectly hidden since t
⋆ is independent of A’s view.
As usual, B outputs 1 (meaning that T = e(g, g)ab/c) if A successfully guesses
d′ = d⋆ and 0 otherwise. ⊓⊔
In the above proof, the simulator does not rewind the adversary at any time.
The scheme thus remains IND-sID-CPA in concurrent environments, where a
batch of users may want to simultaneously run the key generation protocol.
Also, the simulator knows a valid private key for each identity. This allows
using hash proof systems [18, 19] as in [21, 29] to secure the scheme against
chosen-ciphertext attacks. The advantage of this approach, as shown in appen-
dices A and C, is to provide FindKey-CCA security in a white-box setting.
Unlike the Goyal -1 scheme, the basic system provides unconditional FindKey-
CPA security: after an execution of the key generation protocol, even an all pow-
erful PKG does not have any information on the component d3 that is eventually
part of the private key obtained by the new user.
Theorem 2. In the information theoretic sense, no adversary has an advantage
in the FindKey-CPA game.
Proof. The proof directly follows from the perfect hiding property of Pedersen’s
commitment [34] and the perfect witness indistinguishability of the protocol [33]
for proving knowledge of a discrete logarithm representation. Since the commit-
ment R = ht0 ·Xθ and the proof of knowledge of (t0, θ) perfectly hide t0 to the
PKG, all elements of Z∗p are equally likely values of d3 = t0 + t1 as for the last
part of the user’s eventual private key. ⊓⊔
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The original version of the paper [31] describes a hybrid variant of the scheme
that provides white-box FindKey-CCA security using authenticated symmetric
encryption in the fashion of [30, 40, 27] so as to reject all invalid ciphertexts
with high probability. In this version, we only consider schemes with the weak
black-box traceability property.
Theorem 3. In the selective-ID ComputeNewKey game, any PPT adversary
has negligible advantage assuming that the Diffie-Hellman assumption holds.
Proof. For simplicity, we prove the result using an equivalent formulation of the
Diffie-Hellman problem which is to find h1/x given (g, h,X = gx).
At the outset of the game, A declares the identity ID⋆ for which she aims at
finding two private keys d
(1)
ID⋆
, d
(2)
ID⋆
comprising distinct values of d3 = t. Then,
the simulator B prepares the PKG’s public key as follows. Elements h and X
are taken from the modified Diffie-Hellman instance (g, h,X). As in the proof of
theorem 1, B defines Z = g−ID
⋆
·Xα for a randomly chosen α
$
← Z∗p. To define
Y , it chooses random values γ, t′1
$
← Z∗p and sets Y = X
γ · h−t
′
1 .
Queries: in this game, A is allowed to query executions of the key generation
protocol w.r.t. any identity, including ID⋆. The only requirement is that
queried identities be distinct.
- For an identity ID 6= ID⋆, B can proceed exactly as suggested by relation
(5) in the proof of theorem 1 and does not need to rewind A.
- When ID = ID⋆, B conducts the following steps. When A supplies a
group element R = ht0 · Xθ along with a WI proof of knowledge of
(t0, θ), B uses the knowledge extractor of the proof of knowledge that
allows extracting a representation (t0, θ) of R by rewinding A. Next, B
computes t1 = t
′
1 − t0 picks r
$
← Z∗p and returns
(d′1, d
′
2, d
′
3) =
(
gγ+θ · (gID
⋆
· Z)r, Xr, t1
)
. (6)
To see that the above tuple has the appropriate shape, we note that
(Y ·R · ht1)1/x = (Y · ht0+t1 ·Xθ)1/x = (Y · ht
′
1 ·Xθ)1/x = gγ+θ.
Output: upon its termination, A is expected to come up with distinct valid
private keys d
(1)
ID⋆
= (d
(1)
1 , d
(1)
2 , d
(1)
3 ) and d
(2)
ID⋆
= (d
(2)
1 , d
(2)
2 , d
(2)
3 ), such that
t = d
(1)
3 6= d
(2)
3 = t
′, for the identity ID⋆. Given that we must have
d
(1)
1 = (Y · h
t)1/x ·Xαr d
(1)
2 = X
r
d
(2)
1 = (Y · h
t′)1/x ·Xαr
′
d
(2)
2 = X
r′
for some values r, r′ ∈ Zp, B can extract h
1/x =
(
d
(1)
1 /d
(1)
2
α
d
(2)
1 /d
(2)
2
α
) 1
t−t′
. ⊓⊔
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We note that, in the above proof, the simulator does not have to rewind all
executions of the key generation protocol but only one, when the adversary asks
for a private key corresponding to the target identity ID⋆ (recall that all queries
involve distinct identities). Given that the number of rewinds is constant, the
proof still goes through when the simulator is presented with many concurrent
key generation queries. If other executions of the protocol (that necessarily in-
volve identities ID 6= ID⋆) are nested within the one being rewinded when dealing
with ID⋆, the simulator simply runs them as an honest verifier would in the proof
of knowledge and calculates the PKG’s output as per relation (5) in the proof
of theorem 1. Thus, the initial rewind does not trigger any other one and the
simulation still takes polynomial time in a concurrent setting.
Adaptive-ID Security. The scheme can obviously be made IND-ID-CPA if
Waters’ “hash function” F (ID) = u′
∏n
j=1 u
ij
i – where ID = i1 . . . in ∈ {0, 1}
n and
(u′, u1, . . . , un) ∈ G
n+1 is part of mpk – supersedes the Boneh-Boyen identity
hashing F (ID) = gID · Z. The number theoretic hash function F is chosen so
as to equal F (ID) = gJ1(ID) ·XJ2(ID) for integer-valued functions J1, J2 that are
computable by the simulator. The security proof relies on the fact that J1 is
small in absolute value and cancels with non-negligible probability proportional
to 1/q(n+ 1), where q is the number of key generation queries.
When extending the proof of theorem 3 to the adaptive setting, an adversary
with advantage ε allows solving CDH with probability ε/8q2(n+1). The reason
is that the simulator has to guess beforehand which key generation query will
involve the target identity ID⋆. If ID⋆ is expected to appear in the jth query,
when the latter is made, B rewinds A to extract (t0, θ) and uses the special
value t′1 to answer the query as per (6). With probability 1/q, B is fortunate
when choosing j
$
← {1, . . . , q} at the beginning and, again, J1(ID
⋆) happens to
cancel with probability 1/8q(n+ 1) for the target identity.
4 Weak Black-Box Traceability
Theorem 3 showed the infeasibility for users to compute another key from a
different family given their private key. In these regards, a decryption key im-
plements a “1-copyrighted function” – in the terminology of [32, 28] – for the
matching identity. Using this property and the perfect white-box FindKey-CPA
security, we describe a black-box tracing mechanism that protects the user from
a dishonest PKG as long as the latter is withheld access to a decryption oracle.
The tracing strategy is close to the one used by Kiayias and Yung [28] in
2-user traitor tracing schemes, where the tracer determines which one out of two
subscribers produced a pirate decoder. In our setting, one rather has to decide
whether an ε-useful decryption device stems from the PKG or the user himself.
TraceD(mpk, dID, ε): given a well-formed private key dID = (d1, d2, d3) belonging
to a user of identity ID and oracle access to a decoder D that decrypts
ciphertexts encrypted for ID with probability ε, conduct the following steps.
a. Initialize a counter ctr ← 0 and repeat the next steps L = 16λ/ε times:
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1. Choose distinct exponents s, s′
$
← Z∗p at random, compute C1 = X
s,
C2 = (g
ID · Z)s and C3 = e(g, h)
s′ .
2. Calculate C4 = m · e(C1, d1)/
(
e(C2, d2) ·C
d3
3
)
for a randomly chosen
message m ∈ GT .
3. Feed the decryption device D with (C1, C2, C3, C4). If D outputs
m′ ∈ GT such that m
′ = m, increment ctr.
b. If ctr = 0, incriminate the PKG. Otherwise, incriminate the user.
The soundness of this algorithm is proved using a similar technique to [1]. To
ensure the independence of iterations, we assume (as in [1]) that pirate devices
are stateless, or resettable, and do not retain information from prior queries:
each decryption query is answered as if it were the first one and, in particular,
the pirate device cannot self-destruct.
Theorem 4. Under the mDBDH assumption, dishonest users have negligible
chance to produce a decryption device D that makes the tracing algorithm in-
criminate the PKG in the selective-ID ComputeNewKey game.
Proof. The tracing algorithm points to the PKG if it ends up with ctr = 0. The
variable ctr can be seen as the sum of L = 16λ/ε independent random variables
Xi ∈ {0, 1} having the same expected value p1. We have µ = E[ctr] = Lp1.
The Chernoff bound tells us that, for any real number ω such that 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1,
Pr[ctr < (1−ω)µ] < exp(−µω2/2). Under the mDBDH assumption, we certainly
have AdvmDBDH(λ) ≤ ε/2 (since ε/2 is presumably non-negligible). Lemma 1
shows that p1 ≥ ε−Adv
mDBDH(λ), which implies
µ = Lp1 ≥ L(ε−Adv
mDBDH(λ)) ≥
Lε
2
= 8λ. (7)
With ω = 1/2, the Chernoff bound guarantees that
Pr[ctr < 1] < Pr[ctr < 4λ] = Pr[ctr < µ/2] < exp(−µ/8) = exp(−λ).
⊓⊔
Lemma 1. In the selective-ID ComputeNewKey game, if D correctly opens well-
formed ciphertexts with probability ε, the probability that an iteration of the trac-
ing algorithm increases ctr is at least p1 ≥ ε−Adv
mDBDH(λ).
Proof. We consider two games called Game0 and Game1 where the adversary A
is faced with a ComputeNewKey challenger B and produces a decryption device
D which is provided with ciphertexts during a tracing stage. In Game0, D is
given a properly formed encryption of some plaintext m whereas it is given a
ciphertext C where C3 has been changed in Game1. In either case, we call pi
(with i ∈ {0, 1}) the probability that D returns the plaintext m chosen by B.
In the beginning of Game0, A chooses a target identity ID
⋆ and B defines the
system parameters as X = gc, h = gb, Y = Xγ · h−t
⋆
and Z = g−ID
⋆
· Xα for
random α, γ, t⋆
$
← Z∗p. Then, A starts making key generation queries that are
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treated using the same technique as in the proof of theorem 3. Again, B only
has to rewind the WI proof when the query pertains to ID⋆.
At the end of the game, A outputs a decryption box D that correctly decrypts
a fraction ε of ciphertexts. Then, B constructs a ciphertext C as
C1 = g
a, C2 = (g
a)α, C3 = T, C4 = m ·
e(C1, d1)
e(C2, d2) · Ct
⋆
3
where T ∈ GT .
In Game0, B sets T = e(g, g)
ab/c so that we have C3 = e(g, h)
a/c and C
is a valid ciphertext (for the encryption exponent s = a/c) that D correctly
decrypts with probability ε. In this case, D thus outputs m′ = m ∈ GT with
probability p0 = ε. In Game1, T is chosen as a random element of GT and
C = (C1, C2, C3, C4) has the distribution of a ciphertext produced by the tracing
stage and D must output a plaintext m′ = m with probability p1. It is clear that
|p0 − p1| ≤ Adv
mDBDH(λ) and we thus have p1 ≥ ε−Adv
mDBDH(λ). ⊓⊔
The proofs of theorem 4 and lemma 1 extend to the adaptive-ID setting using
the same arguments as in the last paragraph of section 3. As mentioned in the
remark at the end of section 3.2 in section 3, proving adaptive-ID white-box secu-
rity against dishonest users incurs a quadratic degradation factor in the number
of adversarial queries. When transposing the proof of lemma 1 to the adaptive-
ID model, we are faced with the same quadratic degradation in q and the bound
on p1 becomes p1 ≥ ε−8 ·q
2(n+1) ·AdvmDBDH(λ). The proof of theorem 4 goes
through as long as ε ≥ 16 · q2 · (n+1) ·AdvmDBDH(λ) (so that p1 ≥ ε/2). Since
q is polynomial, this is asymptotically the case since q2 · (n+1) ·AdvmDBDH(λ)
remains negligible under the mDBDH assumption.
The system turns out to be the first scheme that is amenable for weak black-
box traceability against dishonest users in the adaptive-ID sense. Due to their
reliance on attribute-based encryption techniques (for which only selective-ID
adversaries were dealt with so far), earlier (weak) black-box A-IBE proposals
[24, 25] are only known to provide selective-ID security against dishonest users.
As for the security against dishonest PKGs, we observed that, in the FindKey-
CPA game, the last part d
(1)
3 = t of the user’s private key is perfectly hidden
to the malicious PKG after the key generation protocol. Then, a pirate decoder
D made by the PKG has negligible chance of decrypting ciphertexts where C3
is random in the same way as the user would. When the user comes across D
and takes it to the court, the latter runs the tracing algorithm using D and the
user’s well-formed key d
(1)
ID
= (d
(1)
1 , d
(1)
2 , d
(1)
3 ) for which d
(1)
3 is independent of D.
Lemma 2. In the FindKey-CPA game, one iteration of the tracing algorithm
increases ctr with probability at most 1/p.
Proof. In an iteration of the tracing stage, D is given C = (C1, C2, C3, C4) such
that C1 = X
s, C2 = (g
ID ·Z)s, C3 = e(g, h)
s′ and C4 = m ·e(g, Y )
s ·e(g, h)(s−s
′)t
for distinct s, s′
$
← Z∗p. Since D has no information on d
(1)
3 = t, for any plaintext
m ∈ GT , there is a value d
(1)
3 that explains C4 and it comes that D returns the
one chosen by the tracer with probability 1/p. ⊓⊔
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We note that a pirate device D generated by the dishonest PKG is able to
recognize invalid ciphertexts in the tracing stage (as it may contain the master
secret x). However, as long as D is assumed stateless, it cannot shutdown or
self-destruct when detecting a tracing attempt. Moreover, with all but negligible
probability, it will never be able to decrypt such invalid ciphertexts in the same
way as the owner of d
(1)
ID
would.
Theorem 5. In the black-box FindKey-CPA game, a dishonest PKG has negli-
gible advantage.
Proof. The dishonest PKG is not detected if it outputs a decryption box for
which the tracing ends with a non-zero value of ctr. From lemma 2, it easily
comes that Pr[ctr 6= 0] = Pr[ctr ≥ 1] ≤ L/p = 16λ/(εp) ≤ 16λ/(2λε). ⊓⊔
To secure the scheme against chosen-ciphertext attacks and preserve the weak
black-box property, we can use the Canetti-Halevi-Katz [15] technique or its
optimizations [11, 12] that do not affect the tracing algorithm.
5 Extension to Gentry’s IBE
In this section, we show how to apply the weak black-box tracing mechanism of
section 4 to Gentry’s IBE. The resulting A-IBE system is obtained by bringing a
simple modification to the key generation protocol of Goyal’s first scheme [24] so
as to perfectly hide the user’s key family from the PKG’s view while preserving
the efficiency of the whole scheme.
The advantage of this scheme is to directly provide adaptive-ID security
against dishonest users and under reductions that are are just as tight as in
Gentry’s system. This benefit comes at the expense of sacrificing the concurrent
security of the key generation protocol (as security proofs require to rewind at
each key generation query) and relying on a somewhat strong assumption.
Definition 4 ([21]). In bilinear groups (G,GT ), the q-Decision Augmented
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent Problem (q-ADBDHE) is to distinguish
the distribution
(
g, gα, . . . , g(α
q), h, h(α
q+2), e(g, h)(α
q+1)
)
from the distribution(
g, gα, . . . , g(α
q), h, h(α
q+2), e(g, h)β
)
, where α, β
$
← Z∗p and h
$
← G∗. The ad-
vantage Advq-ADBDHE
G,GT
(λ) of a distinguisher B is defined as in definition 5
In the description hereafter, the encryption and decryption algorithms are
exactly as in [21]. Since the key generation protocol perfectly conceals the user’s
key family, we can apply the same weak black-box tracing mechanism as in
section 4. The resulting system turns out to be the most efficient adaptive-ID
secure weakly black-box A-IBE to date.
Setup: given a security parameter λ ∈ N, the PKG chooses bilinear groups
(G,GT ) of order p > 2
λ with a generator g
$
← G. It picks h, g
$
← G and
α
$
← Z∗p at random. It defines the master key as msk := α and the master
public key is defined to be mpk := (g, g1 = g
α, h).
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Keygen(PKG,U) : the user U and the PKG interact in the following protocol.
1. U picks t0, θ
$
← Z∗p and sends a commitment R = g
−t0 · (g1 · g
−ID)θ to
the PKG. He also gives an interactive witness indistinguishable proof of
knowledge of the pair (t0, θ).
2. The PKG outputs ⊥ if the proof of knowledge is invalid. Otherwise, it
picks t1
$
← Z∗p and returns
d′ID = (d
′, t′ID) =
(
(h · R · g−t1)1/(α−ID), t1
)
. (8)
3. U computes dID = (d
′/gθ, t′
ID
+ t0) which should equal
dID = (d, tID) =
(
(h · g−(t0+t1))1/(α−ID), t0 + t1
)
. (9)
Then, U checks whether dID satisfies the relation
e(d, g1 · g
−ID) = e(h, g) · e(g, g)−tID . (10)
If so, he sets his private key as dID, which belongs to the key family
identified by nF = tID = t0 + t1. He outputs ⊥ otherwise.
Encrypt: to encrypt m ∈ GT given mpk and ID, choose s
$
← Z∗p and compute
C =
(
C1, C2, C3
)
=
((
g1 · g
−ID
)s
, e(g, g)s, m · e(g, h)s
)
.
Decrypt: given C =
(
C1, C2, C3
)
and dID = (d, tID), compute
m = C3 ·
(
e(C1, d) · C
tID
2
)−1
TraceD(mpk, dID, ε): given a valid private key dID = (d, tID) belonging to user ID
and a ε-useful pirate decoder D, conduct the following steps.
a. Set ctr ← 0 and repeat the next steps L = 16λ/ε times:
1. Choose s, s′
$
← Z∗p such that s 6= s
′ and set C1 = (g1 · g
−ID)s and
C2 = e(g, h)
s′ .
2. Compute C3 = m · e(C1, d) · C
tID
2 for a random message m ∈ GT .
3. Feed the decryption device D with (C1, C2, C3). If D outputsm
′ ∈ GT
such that m′ = m, increment ctr.
b. If ctr = 0, incriminate the PKG. Otherwise, incriminate the user.
The IND-ID-CPA security of the scheme can be simply reduced to that of
Gentry’s IBE as shown in the proof of the next theorem.
Theorem 6. Any IND-ID-CPA adversary against the above A-IBE implies an
IND-ID-CPA attacker against Gentry’s IBE.
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Proof. Let us assume an IND-ID-CPA adversary A in the game described by
definition 2. We show that A gives rise to an IND-ID-CPA adversary B against
Gentry’s IBE.
Our adversary B receives a master public key mpk = (g, g1, h) from her chal-
lenger. When A makes a key generation request for an identity ID, B queries her
own challenger to extract a private key dID = (d, tID) =
(
(h · g−tID)1/(α−ID), tID
)
and starts executing the key generation protocol with in interaction with A. The
latter first supplies a commitment R = g−t0 · (g1 · g
−ID)θ and an interactive WI
proof of knowledge of the pair (t0, θ). Using the knowledge extractor of the proof
of knowledge, B extracts (t0, θ) by rewinding A and returns dID = (d
′, t′
ID
), where
t′
ID
= tID − t0 and d
′ = dID · g
θ.
In the challenge phase,A chooses a target identity ID⋆ and messages (m0,m1),
which B forwards to her own challenger. The latter provides B with a challenge
ciphertext (C1, C2, C3) which is relayed to A. After a second series of key gen-
eration queries, A outputs a bit d ∈ {0, 1}, which is also B’s output. It is easy
to see that, if A is successful, so is B. ⊓⊔
We now turn to prove the weak black-box traceability property.
Lemma 3. In the Adaptive-ID ComputeNewKey game and for a ε-useful device
D, the probability that an iteration of the tracing algorithm increases ctr is at
least p1 ≥ ε−Adv
q-ADBDHE
G,GT
(λ), where q is the number of key generation queries.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of IND-ID-CPA security in [21].
For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that, in an iteration of the tracing
procedure, the probability p1 that D returns the message chosen by the tracer
is significantly smaller than ε. Then, we can construct a distinguisher B for the
q-ADBDHE assumption.
The distinguisher B takes as input a tuple (g, gα, . . . , g(α
q), h, h(α
q+2), T ) and
aims at deciding if T = e(g, h)(α
q+1). It generates the master public key in such
a way that h = gf(α), for some random polynomial f(X) ∈ Zp[X ] of degree q.
At each key generation query, B first computes a valid private key dID = (d, tID)
for the identity ID, by setting tID = f(ID) as in the proof of theorem 1 in
[21]. Then, in the interactive key generation protocol, A sends a commitment
R = g−t0 · (g1 · g
−ID)θ and proves knowledge of the pair (t0, θ), which B extracts
by rewinding A as in the proof of theorem 6. As in the latter, B replies with a
well-distributed pair d′
ID
= (d′, t′
ID
), where t′
ID
= tID − t0 and d
′ = d · gθ.
The game ends with A outputting an identity ID∗, a private key dID⋆ =
(d⋆, t⋆
ID⋆
) and a ε-useful device. In the tracing stage, B first expands the monic
polynomial F (X) = (Xq+2−ID⋆
q+2
)/(X−ID⋆) = Xq+1+FqX
q+· · ·+F1X+F0.
Then, B chooses a plaintext m
$
← GT and computes C = (C1, C2, C3) as
C1 =
h(α
q+2)
h(ID
⋆q+2)
C2 = T · e
(
h,
q∏
j=0
(g(αj)Fj )
)
C3 = m · e(C1, d
⋆) · C
t⋆
ID⋆
2 .
If D returns the correct plaintext m, the distinguisher B halts and return 1. As
in [21], (C1, C2, C3) is a well-formed ciphertext with the encryption exponent
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s = logg(h)F (α) if T = e(g, h)
(αq+1). In this case, B returns 1 with probability
ε since D is a ε-useful device. By assumption, the probability that B returns 1
when T is random is significantly smaller than ε. Therefore, B has non-negligible
advantage as a distinguisher against the q-ADBDHE assumption. ⊓⊔
Theorem 7. In the adaptive-ID ComputeNewKey game, any PPT adversary
has negligible advantage assuming that the ADBDHE assumption holds.
Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of theorem 4. ⊓⊔
The weak black-box security against dishonest PKGs follows from the informa-
tion theoretic secrecy of the user’s private key element tID upon termination of
the key generation protocol.
Theorem 8. In the information theoretic sense, no adversary has an advantage
in the FindKey-CPA game.
To secure the scheme against chosen-ciphertext attacks, we cannot use hash
proof systems as suggested in [21, 29]. This technique would indeed cause the de-
cryption algorithm to reject all invalid ciphertexts with high probability, which
would not be compatible with our weak black-box tracing mechanism.
Fortunately, CCA2-security can be acquired by applying the Canetti-Halevi-
Katz transformation to a two-receiver variant of the Gentry-Waters identity-
based broadcast encryption (IBBE) scheme [22]: one of the two receivers’ identi-
ties is set to be the verification key of a strongly unforgeable one-time signature
and the matching private key is used to sign the whole ciphertext.
Our tracing algorithm can be combined with the latter approach since, in
the Gentry-Waters IBBE [22], private keys have the same shape as in Gentry’s
IBE and one of the ciphertext components lives in the group GT . As already
mentioned, the CHK technique does not affect traceability as, upon decryption,
ill-formed ciphertexts only get rejected when the one-time signature verification
fails. The computational/bandwidth cost of the resulting system exceeds that of
the above A-IBE construction only by a small factor.
6 Extension to Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption
As already stressed in [24, 25], reducing the required amount of trust in PKGs
is an equally important problem in IBE schemes and their extensions such as
attributed-based encryption or identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE).
In this section, we thus show how the underlying idea of previous schemes
can be applied to one of the most efficient IBBE realizations to date.
6.1 The Boneh-Hamburg IBBE
An identity-based broadcast encryption scheme, as formalized in [2], can be
seen as an IBE where ciphertexts can be decrypted by more than one receiver.
Syntactically, it consists of four algorithms:
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– Setup: given a security parameter and a boundN on the number of receivers
per ciphertext, this algorithm outputs a master key pair (mpk,msk).
– KeyGen: is used by the PKG to derive a private key KID for an identity ID.
– Encrypt: takes as input a plaintext m, a master public key mpk and a
set S = {ID1, . . . , IDn} of receivers’ identities, where n ≤ N . It outputs a
ciphertext C.
– Decrypt: takes as input the master public key mpk, a ciphertext C, a set
of receivers S = {ID1, . . . , IDn} and a private key dID corresponding to some
identity ID ∈ S. It outputs a plaintext m or ⊥.
In [10], Boneh and Hamburg showed how to turn the Boneh-Boyen-Goh hi-
erarchical IBE [7] into an efficient IBBE system with constant-size ciphertexts
and linear-size private keys in the bound N on the number of receivers per ci-
phertext. Their construction was shown to derive from a more general primitive
termed “spatial encryption”. Its security (in the selective-ID sense) was estab-
lished under the following assumption introduced in [7].
Definition 5. Let (G,GT ) be bilinear groups of order p and g ∈ G. The ℓ-
Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (ℓ-DBDHE) problem is, given(
g, gα, g(α
2), . . . , g(α
ℓ), g(α
ℓ+2), . . . , g(α
2ℓ), h, T
)
∈ G2ℓ+1×GT for random α
$
← Z∗p
and h
$
← G, to decide whether T = e(g, h)(α
ℓ+1). The advantage Advℓ-DBDHEG,GT (λ)
of a distinguisher B is defined in the usual way.
In the following, we use the same notations as in [10] and, for any vector
a = (a0, . . . , aN ) ∈ Z
N+1
p , g
a stands for the vector (ga0 , . . . , gaN ) ∈ GN+1.
The description of the Boneh-Hamburg IBBE scheme is as follows.
Setup(λ,N): given a security parameter λ ∈ N an the maximal number of
receivers N ∈ N per ciphertext, choose bilinear groups (G,GT ) of prime
order p > 2λ and a generator g
$
← G. Choose z
$
← G as well a (N +1)-vector
h = (h0, h1, . . . , hN)
$
← GN+1 of random generators so that hi = g
ai for
i = 0, . . . , N with a randomly chosen a = (a0, . . . , aN)
$
← ZN+1p . Finally,
pick α
$
← Z∗p, g2
$
← G and compute g1 = g
α. The master public key is
mpk = (g, g1 = g
α, g2, z,h = g
a) while the master secret key is msk = (a, α).
Keygen(msk, ID): to generate a private key for an identity ID, choose a random
r
$
← Z∗p and compute
KID = (K1,K2, T0, . . . , TN−1)
=
(
gα2 · z
r, gr, hr1 · h
−ID·r
0 , h
r
2 · h
−ID·r
1 , . . . , h
r
N · h
−ID·r
N−1
)
for which the “delegation component” (T0, . . . , TN−1) ∈ G
N can be expressed
as gr·M
t
1·a, for some matrix M1 ∈ Z
(N+1)×N
p , which will be defined below.
Encrypt(mpk, S,m): to encryptm ∈ GT for the receiver set S = {ID1, . . . , IDn},
where n ≤ N ,
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1. Expand the polynomial
P (X) =
∏
i∈S
(X − IDi) = ρnX
n + ρn−1X
n−1 + · · ·+ ρ1X + ρ0. (11)
2. Pick s
$
← Z∗p and compute
C = (C0, C1, C2) =
(
m · e(g1, g2)
s, gs,
(
z · hρ00 · h
ρ1
1 · · ·h
ρn
n
)s)
.
Decrypt(mpk,KID, C, S): parse S as {ID1, . . . , IDn}, C as (C0, C1, C2) and KID
as
KID = (K1,K2, T0, . . . , TN−1) ∈ G
N+2.
1. Expand the polynomial
PID(X) =
∏
IDj∈S\{ID}
(X−IDj) = y
(ID)
n−1X
n−1+y
(ID)
n−2X
n−2+· · ·+y
(ID)
1 X+y
(ID)
0
and use its coefficients to compute
(DID, dID) =
(
K1 · T
y
(ID)
0
0 · T
y
(ID)
1
1 · · ·T
y
(ID)
n−1
n−1 , K2
)
(12)
=
(
gα2 ·
(
z · hρ00 · h
ρ1
1 · · ·h
ρn
n
)r
, gr
)
(13)
where ρ0, . . . , ρn are the coefficients of P (X) (calculated as per (11)).
2. Recover the plaintext as
m = C0 · e
(
C1, DID
)−1
· e
(
C2, dID
)
. (14)
To see why step 1 of the decryption algorithm works, one observes that, for any
polynomials (X−ID) and PID(X) = y
(ID)
n−1X
n−1+y
(ID)
n−2X
n−2+· · ·+y
(ID)
1 X+y
(ID)
0 ,
the coefficients of P (X) = (X − ID)PID(X) = ρnX
n + · · ·+ ρ1X + ρ0 are given
by
ρ =


ρ0
ρ1
ρ2
...
ρn


=M1 · y =


−ID
1 −ID
1 −ID
. . .
. . .
1 −ID
1


·


y
(ID)
0
y
(ID)
1
...
y
(ID)
n−1


,
where M1 ∈ Z
(n+1)×n
p . Since the latter matrix is such that
M t1 · a|n+1 =M
t
1 ·


a0
a1
...
an

 =


a1 − ID · a0
a2 − ID · a1
...
an − ID · an−1

 ,
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for each private key KID, the first n delegation components satisfy
(T0, . . . , Tn−1) =
(
hr1 · h
−ID·r
0 , h
r
2 · h
−ID·r
1 , . . . , h
r
n · h
−ID·r
n−1
)
= grM
t
1·a.
Therefore, since ρ =M1 · y, we have
(z ·
n∏
k=0
hρkk )
r = zr · gr·ρ
t·a = zr · gry
t·Mt1·a = zr · T
y
(ID)
0
0 · · ·T
y
(ID)
n−1
n−1
which explains the transition between relations (12) and (13). To explain the
second step of the decryption algorithm, we note that, for each ID ∈ S, the pair
(DID, dID) satisfies
e(DID, g) = e(g1, g2) · e(z · h
ρ0
0 · h
ρ1
1 · · ·h
ρn
n , dID) (15)
By raising both members of (15) to the power s ∈ Z∗p, where s is the random
encryption exponent, we see why m can be recovered as per (14).
The security of this scheme was proved [10] under the (N + 1)-DBDHE
assumption in the selective-ID model. In the context of IBBE schemes, the IND-
sID-CPA model was formalized in [2]. It requires the adversary to choose upfront
(i.e., before seeing mpk) the set S⋆ = {ID⋆1, . . . , ID
⋆
n⋆} of identities under which
the challenge ciphertext C⋆ will be generated. The adversary is then allowed to
query private keys for identities IDi 6∈ S
⋆ and eventually aims at guessing which
one out of two messages of her choice was encrypted in the generation of C⋆.
6.2 A weak Black-Box Accountable Authority IBBE
The idea of the scheme in section 3 applies to construct an IBBE scheme with
short ciphertexts and accountable authorities. The syntax of accountable au-
thority IBBE (A-IBBE) schemes extends that of IBBE systems in the same way
as the A-IBE primitive extends IBE. The resulting construction goes as follows.
Setup(λ,N): is as in the Boneh-Hamburg IBBE but the algorithm chooses an
additional random group element g3. The master public key thus consists of
mpk = (g, g1 = g
α, g2, g3, z,h = g
a) while the master secret is msk = (a, α).
Keygen(PKG,U) : the two parties conduct the following interactive steps.
1. U picks t0, θ
$
← Z∗p and sends a commitment R = g
t0
2 · g
θ to the PKG
and provides an interactive WI proof of knowledge of (t0, θ).
2. The PKG outputs ⊥ if the proof of knowledge is invalid. Otherwise, it
picks r, t1
$
← Z∗p and returns
K ′ID = (K
′
1,K
′
2, T
′
0, . . . , T
′
N−1, t
′
ID)
=
(
(gt12 ·R · g3)
α · zr, gr, hr1 · h
−ID·r
0 , h
r
2 · h
−ID·r
1 , . . . , h
r
N · h
−ID·r
N−1 , t1
)
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3. U picks r′
$
← Z∗p and computes KID = (K1,K2, T0, . . . , TN−1, tID), where
K1 = (K
′
1/g
θ
1) · z
r′ , K2 = K
′
2 · g
r′ , Ti = T
′
i · (hi+1 · h
−ID
i )
r′ for indices
i = 0, . . . , N − 1 and t′
ID
+ t0, so that
KID = (K1,K2, T0, . . . , TN−1, tID)
=
(
(gt0+t12 · g3)
α · zr
′′
, gr
′′
, hr
′′
1 · h
−ID·r′′
0 , . . . , h
r′′
N · h
−ID·r′′
N−1 , t0 + t1
)
,
where r′′ = r + r′. Then, U checks whether dID satisfies the relation
e(K1, g) = e(g1, g2)
tID · e(g1, g3) · e(z,K2),
and e(g, Ti) = e(K2, hi+1 · h
−ID
i ) for each i ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}.
Encrypt(mpk, S,m): to encryptm ∈ GT for the receiver set S = {ID1, . . . , IDn},
where n ≤ N ,
1. Expand P (X) ∈ Zp[X ] as
P (X) =
∏
i∈S
(X − IDi) = ρnX
n + ρn−1X
n−1 + · · ·+ ρ1X + ρ0.
2. Choose s
$
← Z∗p and compute
C = (C0, C1, C2, C3)
=
(
m · e(g1, g3)
s, gs,
(
z · hρ00 · h
ρ1
1 · · ·h
ρn
n
)s
, e(g1, g2)
s
)
.
Decrypt(mpk,KID, C, S): parse C as (C0, C1, C2, C3) and KID as
KID = (K1,K2, T0, . . . , TN−1, tID) ∈ G
N+2 × Zp.
1. Expand PID(X) ∈ Zp[X ] as
PID(X) =
∏
IDj∈S\{ID}
(X−IDj) = y
(ID)
n−1X
n−1+y
(ID)
n−2X
n−2+· · ·+y
(ID)
1 X+y
(ID)
0
and compute the decryption key
(DID, dID, tID) =
(
K1 · T
y
(ID)
0
0 · T
y
(ID)
1
1 · · ·T
y
(ID)
n−1
n−1 , K2, tID
)
=
(
(gtID2 · g3)
α ·
(
z · hρ00 · h
ρ1
1 · · ·h
ρn
n
)r
, gr, tID
)
.
2. Recover the plaintext as
m = C0 · e
(
C1, DID
)−1
· e
(
C2, dID
)
· CtID3 .
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TraceD(mpk,KID, ε): given a valid private key KID for the identity ID and a
ε-useful decoder D, the tracing algorithm proceeds in a similar fashion to
previous schemes, by feeding D with ciphertexts C = (C0, C1, C2, C3) and
the receiver set S. In the generation of C, C1 and C2 are calculated as
specified by the encryption algorithm. On the other hand, C3 is chosen as
a random element of GT and C0 is obtained by applying the decryption
algorithm to S and (C1, C2, C3).
Correctness is implied the fact that the decryption key (DID, dID, tID) satisfies
the relation e(DID, g) = e(g1, g2)
tID ·e(g1, g3) ·e(z ·
∏n
i=0 h
ρi
i , dID) and raising both
members to the power s as in previous schemes.
To avoid repeating the work of Boneh and Hamburg, we prove the security
properties of the above A-IBBE system by reducing them to the IND-sID-CPA
security of the underlying IBBE.
Theorem 9. The A-IBBE scheme is secure under the (N+1)-DBDHE assump-
tion. More precisely, any IND-sID-CPA adversary against it implies an equally
successful IND-sID-CPA attacker against the Boneh-Hamburg IBBE.
Proof. We show that an IND-sID-CPA adversary A against the A-IBBE scheme
gives rise to a “real-or-random” IND-sID-CPA adversary B (i.e., in which the
adversary A outputs a single messagem and has to decide whether the challenge
ciphertext C⋆ encrypts m or a random message) against the Boneh-Hamburg
IBBE. Hence, the security of the latter implies the security of our scheme.
When A chooses her set of target identities S⋆ = {ID⋆1, . . . , ID
⋆
n⋆}, with n
⋆ ≤
N , our adversary B forwards S⋆ to her own challenger and receives a master
public key mpkBH = (g, g1 = g
α, g2, z,h = g
a). Then, B picks t∗, β
$
← Z∗p,
computes g3 = g
−t∗
2 g
β and provides A with mpk = (g, g1, g2, g3, z,h).
At any time, A may request an execution of the key generation protocol for
an arbitrary identity ID 6∈ S⋆. At the beginning of each such protocol, A sends a
commitment R = gt02 · g
θ and interactively proves knowledge of (t0, θ), which B
extracts by rewinding A. Then, B chooses t1
$
← Z∗p, sets t = t0 + t1 and queries
her own IND-sID-CPA challenger to obtain a private key
K˜ID = (K˜1, K˜2, T˜0, . . . , T˜N−1) =
(
gα2 ·z
r, gr, hr1·h
−ID·r
0 , h
r
2·h
−ID·r
1 , . . . , h
r
N ·h
−ID·r
N−1
)
for the identity ID chosen by A. The latter is turned into an A-IBBE private key
and re-randomized by setting
KID = (K1,K2, T0, . . . , TN−1) =
(
gβ1 · K˜
(t−t⋆)
1 · z
r′ ,
K˜
(t−t⋆)
2 · g
r′ , T˜
(t−t⋆)
0 · (h1 · h
−ID
0 )
r′ , . . . , T˜
(t−t⋆)
n−1 · (hN · h
−ID
N−1)
r′
)
,
where r′
$
← Z∗p. The new key KID is easily seen to have the same distribution as
those obtained in step 3 of the key generation protocol. Finally, A obtains the
“blinded key” K ′
ID
= (K ′1,K
′
2, T
′
0, . . . , T
′
N−1), where K
′
1 = K1 · g
θ
1 .
In the challenge phase, A chooses a pair of target messages (m0,m1). The
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adversary B chooses a random plaintext m⋆
$
← GT , which she sends to her own
“real-or-random” challenger. The latter replies with a challenge ciphertext
C⋆ = (C0, C1, C2) =
(
m · e(g1, g2)
s⋆ , gs
⋆
,
(
z · hρ00 · h
ρ1
1 · · ·h
ρn⋆
n⋆
)s⋆)
.
for the receiver set S⋆ = {ID∗1, . . . , ID
∗
n⋆}, where m is either m
⋆ or a random
element of GT . The adversary B picks a random bit d
$
← {0, 1} and computes
C′ = (C′0, C1, C2, C0/m
⋆) where C′0 = md · (C0/m
⋆)−t
∗
· e(g1, C1)
β and C′ is
relayed to A as a challenge ciphertext. After a second series of key generation
queries, A outputs a bit d′ ∈ {0, 1}, and B outputs “real” if d′ = d and “random”
otherwise. It is easy to see that, if C⋆ encrypts a random plaintext, then C0/m
⋆
can be expressed as C0/m
⋆ = e(g1, g2)
s⋆−s′ , where s⋆ = logg(C1) and for some
s′ 6= 0. In this case, we obtain that C′0 = md ·e(g1, g3)
s⋆ ·e(g1, g2)
s′t⋆ statistically
hides md (and thus Pr[d
′ = d] = 1/2) since A has no information on t∗. In
contrast, if C⋆ encrypts m⋆, then C′ is a valid encryption of md for the A-
IBBE scheme, so that Pr[d′ = d] = 1/2 + AdvBH-IND-sID-CPAG,GT (λ), where the
latter advantage function denotes the maximal “real-or-random” advantage of
any IND-sID-CPA adversary against the Boneh-Hamburg IBBE. It comes that
B’s advantage in the real-or-random game is exactly AdvBH-IND-sID-CPAG,GT (λ). ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. In the selective-ID ComputeNewKey game and for a ε-useful decryp-
tion device D, the probability that an iteration of the tracing procedure increases
ctr is at least p1 ≥ ε−Adv
(N+1)-DBDHE
G,GT
(λ).
Proof. Let us assume that, at the end of the selective-ID ComputeNewKey game,
the dishonest user A outputs a device D for which a given iteration of the tracing
procedure increments ctr with a probability p1, which is significantly smaller
than ε. Then, we show how to obtain an IND-sID-CPA adversary B against the
Boneh-Hamburg IBBE.
The adversary B plays the IND-sID-CPA game against a challenger CBH and
plays A’s challenger in the selective-ID ComputeNewKey game. At the outset
of the latter, A chooses a target identity ID∗ and B chooses her set of target
identities as S⋆ = {ID⋆}. When seeing the description of S⋆, the IBBE challenger
CBH generates a master public key mpkBH = (g, g1, g2, z,h). Then, B chooses
t⋆, β
$
← Z∗p and sets g3 = g
−t⋆
2 · g
β. The master public key of the A-IBBE system
is defined as mpk = (g, g1, g2, g3, z,h) and given to A.
Then, A starts making a number of key generation queries. For each key
generation query involving an identity ID 6= ID⋆, B proceeds by invoking her own
challenger CBH, exactly as in the proof of theorem 9. When A queries a private
key KID⋆ for the target identity ID
⋆, B first rewinds the proof of knowledge so as
to extract the pair (t0, θ) such that R = g
t0
2 ·g
θ in the commitment. Then, it sets
t1 = t
⋆ − t0 (in such a way that t = t0 + t1 = t
⋆). In this case, B can compute
an A-IBBE private key KID⋆ on her own (without having to query C
BH) as
(K1,K2, T0, . . . , TN−1, tID⋆) =
(
gβ1 · z
r, gr, (h1 · h
−ID⋆
0 )
r, . . . , (hN · h
−ID⋆
N−1)
r, t⋆
)
,
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which is well-formed since gt
⋆
2 · g3 = g
β. Finally, B returns the “blinded key”
K ′
ID⋆
=
(
gθ1 ·K1,K2, T0, . . . , TN−1, t1
)
to A.
At the end of the game, A outputs a private key KID⋆ and a ε-useful device
for the identity ID⋆. In the tracing stage, B sends a random plaintext m⋆
$
← GT
to CBH who replies with a challenge (C⋆0 , C
⋆
1 , C
⋆
2 ), where C
⋆
0 = m
⋆ ·e(g1, g2)
s⋆ and
C1 = g
s⋆ if CBH is playing the “real” game. On the other hand, if CBH decides to
play the “random” game, C⋆0 is random in GT . To construct a ciphertext for the
A-IBBE scheme, B sets C3 = C
⋆
0/m
⋆ (which equals e(g1, g2)
s⋆ in the “real” game
and e(g1, g2)
s′ , with s′ 6= s⋆ in the “random” game), C1 = C
⋆
1 and C2 = C
⋆
2 . To
compute C0, B chooses m
$
← GT and calculates
C0 = m · e
(
C1, DID⋆
)
· e
(
C2, dID⋆
)−1
· C−t
⋆
3 , (16)
where (DID⋆ , dID⋆ , t
⋆) is the decryption key for the identity ID⋆ and the receiver
set S⋆, which is obtained from KID⋆ .
If D returns the correct plaintext m, the distinguisher B halts and outputs
“real” (meaning that CBH is playing the “real” game). Otherwise, B outputs
“random”. In the former case, (C0, C1, C2, C3) is a valid ciphertext for the
receiver set S⋆ = {ID⋆} and B returns 1 with probability ε since D is a ε-
useful device. If CBH plays the random game, logg(C1) 6= loge(g1,g2)(C3) and
(C0, C1, C2, C3) has the distribution of a ciphertext generated in iterations of
the tracing stage. In this case, the probability that D returns the plaintext
m is p1. By the definition of IND-sID-CPA security of the IBBE scheme, we
must have ε− p1 ≤ Adv
BH-IND-sID-CPA
G,GT (λ). Since the result of [10] implies that
AdvBH-IND-sID-CPAG,GT (λ) ≤ Adv
(N+1)-DBDHE
G,GT
(λ), the claimed result follows. ⊓⊔
Theorem 10. In the selective-ID ComputeNewKey game, any PPT adversary
has negligible advantage assuming that the (N + 1)-DBDHE assumption holds.
Proof. Again, the proof is similar to the one of theorem 4 and is omitted. ⊓⊔
As in previous schemes, as long as pirate devices are stateless, no dishonest PKG
can create one that gets the tracing procedure to accuse the user and the result
holds unconditionally.
Theorem 11. In the information theoretic sense, no adversary has an advan-
tage in the FindKey-CPA game.
We remark that it is possible to re-write the description of our scheme of sec-
tion 3 in such a way that its security properties can be reduced to the security
of the first Boneh-Boyen IBE [5] (in the same way as we reduced the security of
our A-IBBE to the security of the underlying IBBE). However, giving a proof
from scratch allowed us to avoid rewinding as much as possible in section 3. It
would be interesting to see if, in our A-IBBE, the number of rewinds can also
be minimized by giving direct proofs under the (N +1)-DBDHE assumption for
theorem 9 and lemma 4.
It is also noteworthy that other IBE-related primitives can be made account-
able using the same technique. Due to their algebraic similarities with the “com-
mutative blinding” IBE family, the “large-universe” attribute-based encryption
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schemes described in [35, 26] can easily be tweaked to support accountability in
the weak black-box model.
7 Conclusion
We described the first A-IBE system allowing for weak black-box traceability
while retaining short ciphertexts and private keys. We also suggested a white-box
variant that dwells secure against dishonest PKGs equipped with a decryption
oracle. In the black-box setting, it remains an open problem to achieve the latter
property without significantly degrading the efficiency.
In the setting of hierarchical IBE schemes, it would also be desirable to see
how the problem can be addressed. When a pirate decoder is found to decrypt ci-
phertexts intended for a node, one should be able to determine which ancestor(s)
of that node should be blamed.
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A A Variant with White-Box FindKey-CCA security
To achieve IND-sID-CCA2 security, we can hybridize the scheme using an au-
thenticated symmetric encryption scheme (as defined in appendix B) as pre-
viously considered in [37, 29] in the context of identity-based encryption. The
obtained variant is reminiscent of a version of Gentry’s IBE described in [29]
and can be proved IND-sID-CCA2 secure in a completely analogous way.
Setup: is the same as in section 3 except that the PKG now chooses two ele-
ments YA, YB
$
← G instead of a single one Y . An authenticated symmetric
encryption scheme (E,D) of keylength ℓ ∈ N, a secure key derivation func-
tion KDF : GT → {0, 1}
ℓ and a target collision-resistant hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p are also needed. The master key is set as msk := x and the
global public key is mpk := (X = gx, h, YA, YB, Z,H,KDF, (E,D)).
.Keygen(PKG,U) : to obtain a private key for his identity ID, a user U interacts
with the PKG as follows.
1. U sends R = ht0 · Xθ to the PKG and proves his knowledge of the
underlying pair (t0, θ)
$
← (Z∗p)
2 in a witness indistinguishable fashion.
2. The PKG outputs ⊥ if the proof is incorrect. Otherwise, it picks random
values r′A, tA,1, r
′
B, tB
$
← Z∗p and returns
d′ID,A = (d
′
A,1, d
′
A,2, d
′
A,3) =
(
(Y · R · htA,1)1/x · (gID · Z)r
′
A , Xr
′
A , tA,1
)
d′ID,B = (d
′
B,1, d
′
B,2, d
′
B,3) =
(
(YB · h
tB )1/x · (gID · Z)r
′
B , Xr
′
B , tB
)
3. U computes dID,A = (d
′
A,1/g
θ · (gID · Z)r
′′
A , d′A,2 ·X
r′′A , d′A,3 + t0) as well
as dID,B = (d
′
B,1 · (g
ID · Z)r
′′
B , d′B,2 · X
r′′B , dB,3), for randomly chosen
r′′A, r
′′
B
$
← Z∗p so that
dID,A = (dA,1, dA,2, dA,3) =
(
(YA · h
tA)1/x · (gID · Z)rA , XrA , tA
)
dID,B = (dB,1, dB,2, dB,3) =
(
(YB · h
tB )1/x · (gID · Z)rB , XrB , tB
)
where tA = t0+ tA,1, rA = r
′
A+r
′′
A and rB = r
′
B+r
′′
B. He checks whether
dID,A and dID,B respectively satisfy
e(dA,1, X) = e(YA, g) · e(h, g)
dA,3 · e(gID · Z, dA,2) (17)
e(dB,1, X) = e(YB, g) · e(h, g)
dB,3 · e(gID · Z, dB,2). (18)
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If so, he sets his private key as (dID,A, dID,B) and the latter belongs to
the family of decryption key identified by nF = dA,3 = tA.
Encrypt: to encrypt m given mpk and ID, choose s
$
← Z∗p and compute
C =
(
C1, C2, C3, C4
)
=
(
Xs, (gID · Z)s, e(g, h)s, EK(m)
)
where K = KDF (e(g, YA)
s · e(g, YB)
κs) and κ = H(C1, C2, C3).
Decrypt: given C =
(
C1, C2, C3, C4
)
and dID = (dID,A, dID,B), compute the
plaintext m = DK(C4) (which may just be ⊥ if C4 is not a valid authenti-
cated encryption) using the key
K = KDF
( e(C1, dA,1 · dκB,1)
e(C2, dA,2 · dκB,2) · C
dA,3+κdB,3
3
)
(19)
with κ = H(C1, C2, C3).
Trace: given an alleged private key (dID,A, dID,B), with dID,A = (dA,1, dA,2, dA,3),
for an identity ID, check the validity of dID w.r.t. ID using relations (17)-(18).
If valid, the key is declared as a member of the family nF = d3,A = tA.
The proof of IND-sID-CCA security is omitted here as it is a standard application
of the technique used in [29], which in turn borrows ideas from [30, 40, 27].
In the chosen-ciphertext scenario, the white-box FindKey security is no
longer unconditional but relies on the (weak) ciphertext integrity property of
the symmetric encryption scheme.
Theorem 12. The scheme is FindKey-CCA secure assuming the security of the
key derivation function and the (weak) ciphertext integrity of the symmetric en-
cryption scheme. The advantage of an adversary A making at most qd decryption
queries is bounded by
AdvFindKey-CCAA (λ, ℓ) ≤ 2 · qd ·Adv
CT-INT(ℓ)
+ 2 · qd ·Adv
KDF(λ, ℓ) +
2q2d + qd + 1
p
.
Proof. Given in appendix C. ⊓⊔
B Authenticated Symmetric Encryption
A symmetric encryption scheme is specified by a pair (E,D), where E is the
encryption algorithm and D is the decryption procedure, and a key space K(ℓ)
where ℓ ∈ N is a security parameter. The security of authenticated symmet-
ric encryption is defined by means of two games that capture the ciphertext
indistinguishability and ciphertext (one-time) integrity properties.
Definition 6. A symmetric encryption scheme is secure in the sense of authen-
ticated encryption if any PPT adversary has negligible advantage in the following
games.
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1. The IND-SYM game. For any PPT algorithm A, the model considers the
following game, where ℓ ∈ N is a security parameter:
GameIND-SYMA (ℓ)
K
$
← K(ℓ)
(m0,m1, s)← A(find, ℓ)
d⋆
$
← {0, 1}
c⋆ ← EK(md⋆)
d← A(guess, s, c⋆)
return 1 if d = d⋆ and 0 otherwise.
A’s advantage is AdvIND-SYMA (ℓ) = |Pr[Game
IND-SYM
A = 1]− 1/2|.
2. The CT-INT game. Let A be a PPT algorithm. We consider the following
game, where ℓ ∈ N is a security parameter:
GameCT-INTA (ℓ)
K
$
← K(ℓ)
(m, s)← A(find, ℓ)
c← EK(m)
c′ ← A(create, ℓ, c)
return 1 if c′ 6= c and DK(c
′) 6=⊥
0 otherwise.
A’s advantage is now defined as AdvCT-INTA (ℓ) = Pr[Game
CT-INT
A = 1].
The notion of weak ciphertext integrity is defined in the same way but the
adversary is not allowed to see an encryption c under the challenge key K.
C Proof of Theorem 12
The proof proceeds with a sequence of two games, in which Si denotes the event
that the adversary A wins during Gamei with i ∈ {0, 1}.
Game0: is the FindKey-CCA experiment. The dishonest PKG A generates the
master public key, chooses an identity ID that she wishes to be challenged
upon. She interacts with the challenger in a key generation protocol, upon
completion of which the challenger B obtains a decryption key consisting of
two triples d
(1)
ID,A = (dA,1
(1), dA,2
(1), dA,3
(1)), d
(1)
ID,B = (dB,1
(1), dB,2
(1), dB,3
(1))
that should pass the key sanity check (otherwise, B aborts). At this stage, A
knows t
(1)
B = d
(1)
B,3 but has no information on d
(1)
A,3 = t
(1)
A or on the values
rA = logX(d
(1)
A,2) and rB = logX(d
(1)
B,2) (by the construction of the key gener-
ation protocol). In the next phase, A starts making a number of decryption
queries that the challenger handles using (d
(1)
ID,A, d
(1)
ID,B). Namely, when queried
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on a ciphertext C = (C1, C2, C3, C4), B calculates
ψ =
e
(
C1, d
(1)
A,1 · d
(1)
B,1
κ)
e
(
C2, d
(1)
A,2 · d
(1)
B,2
κ)
· C
d
(1)
A,3+κdB,3
(1)
3
,
where κ = H(C1, C2, C3), K = KDF (ψ) and m = DK(C4) which is returned to
A (and may be ⊥ if C is declared invalid).
At the end of the game, A outputs a key (d
(2)
ID,A, d
(2)
ID,B) and wins if d
(2)
ID,A parses
into (dA,1
(2), dA,2
(2), dA,3
(2)) such that dA,3
(1) = t
(1)
A = t
(2)
A = dA,3
(2).
We note that decryption queries on well-formed ciphertexts do not reveal any
information to A (since all well-formed keys yield the same result). We will show
that, provided all ill-formed ciphertexts are rejected by B, A still has negligible
information on t
(1)
A in the end of the game. For convenience, we distinguish two
types of invalid ciphertexts: type I ciphertexts (C1, C2, C3, C4) are such that
logX(C1) 6= logF (ID)(C2) (and can be told apart from valid ones by checking if
e(C1, F (ID)) 6= e(X,C2)), where F (ID) = g
ID ·Z, whereas type II ciphertexts are
those for which logX(C1) = logF (ID)(C2) 6= loge(g,h)(C3).
Game1: is as Game0 but B rejects all type I invalid ciphertexts (that are pub-
licly recognizable). Such a malformed ciphertext comprises elements C1 = X
s1 ,
C2 = F (ID)
s1−s
′
1 and C3 = e(g, h)
s1−s
′′
1 where s′1 > 0 and s
′′
1 ≥ 0. Hence, the
symmetric key K that B calculates is derived from
ψ = e(g, Y s1A · Y
κs1
B ) · e(F (ID), X)
s′1(rA+κrB) · e(g, h)s
′′
1 (t
(1)
A +κt
(1)
B ) (20)
where κ = H(C1, C2, C3). Upon termination of the key generation protocol, A
has no information on rA, rB (as B re-randomizes its key). Even if κ was the
same in all decryption queries (which may happen if these queries all involve
identical (C1, C2, C3)), the second term of the product (20) remains almost uni-
formly random to A at each new query. Indeed, for each failed one, A learns
at most one value that is not rA + κrB. After i attempts, p − i candidates
are left and the distance between the uniform distribution on GT and that of
e(F (ID), X)s
′
1(rA+κrB) becomes at most i/p ≤ qd/p. Then, the only way for A
to cause the new rejection rule to apply is to forge a symmetric authenticated
encryption for an essentially random key K. A standard argument shows that,
throughout all queries, the probability of B not rejecting a type I ciphertext
is smaller than qd · (Adv
CT-INT(ℓ) +AdvKDF(λ, ℓ) + qd/p). It easily comes that
|Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]| ≤ qd · (Adv
CT-INT(λ) +AdvKDF(λ, ℓ) + qd/p).
We now consider type II invalid queries. While A knows t
(1)
B , she has initially
no information on t
(1)
A and the last term of the product (20) is unpredictable
to her at the first type II query. Each such rejected query allows A to rule
out at most one candidate as for the value t
(1)
A . After i ≤ qd unsuccessful type
II queries, she is left with at least p − i candidates at the next type II query,
where the distance between the uniform distribution on GT and that of ψ (cal-
culated as per (20)) becomes smaller than i/p ≤ qd/p. Again, one can show that,
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throughout all queries, the probability of B not rejecting a type II ciphertext is
at most qd · (Adv
CT-INT(ℓ)+AdvKDF(λ, ℓ)+ qd/p). Let us call type-2 the latter
event. If all invalid ciphertexts are rejected, A’s probability of success is given
by Pr[S1|¬type-2] ≤ 1/(p− qd) ≤ (qd + 1)/p. Since
Pr[S1] = Pr[S1 ∧ type-2] + Pr[S1 ∧ ¬type-2]
≤ Pr[type-2] + Pr[S1|¬type-2]Pr[¬type-2]
≤ Pr[type-2] + Pr[S1|¬type-2]
≤ qd ·
(
AdvCT-INT(ℓ) +AdvKDF(λ, ℓ) +
qd
p
)
+
qd + 1
p
and |Pr[S0]− Pr[S1]| ≤ qd · (Adv
CT-INT(λ) +AdvKDF(λ, ℓ) + qd/p), the claimed
upper bound follows. ⊓⊔
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